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THE POWERAND POVERTY OF SCIENCE 
STANLEY L. JAKI 
Today the name of Vannevar Bush may mean very little. Only half a century ago 
he was the captain of an American science that had just proved itself an unparal-
leled source of power in a global contestation. Yet even he greatly underestimated 
that power when in 1950 he declared that transcontinental ballistic missiles were 
mere wishful thinking. Within ten years rockets began to carry man around the 
Earth. In still another decade man landed on the Moon. A manned exploration of 
Mars may not be too far away. 
A hundred years ago it was still not unscientific to dismiss talk about atoms as 
needless theorizing. Yet Ernest Rutherford, who shortly afterwards did more than 
anyone else to unveil the structure of atoms, scoffed, as late as 1934, at the idea that 
man would ever harness the awesome power of atomic energy. Within a decade 
the first atomic bombs provided the power to end a devastatingly vast war already 
in its fifth year that conceivably might have dragged on for another year and could 
have claimed another million or so victims. 
By then radar proved itself indispensable to decide the issue of the war in 
Europe, a fact that quickly became known. For years nothing was disclosed about 
another crucial fact, the breaking of the German secret code, made possible in part 
by reliance on a device which at that time was not even known under its present 
name, computer. Computers were sti ll unwieldy monsters filling entire rooms and 
had to be cooled by large refrigeration units. Worse, dozens of electron tubes were 
breaking down in those "calculating machines" every day, often stopping their oper-
ation. Today, computers far more powerful than the one used for landing on the 
Moon can be put in a briefcase. 
Compared with these feats, utterly trivial should appear any reference to auto-
mobiles and airplanes, both of which made their debut about a hundred years ago. 
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Within a few decades Henry Ford put America on wheels and the world quickly fol-
lowed suit. The Parisian taxis that in October 1914 rushed the needed reserve units to 
the Marne anticipated history. Military trucks made possible the quick outflanking of the 
Iraqi defenses and were in turn supported by incredibly sophisticated machines known as 
Stealth bombers, Patriot missiles, and satellite communication systems. 
Iraq merely played the role of proxy for a now defunct Soviet Union that failed to 
understand and utilize the power of science to the full, in spite of swearing by a so-called 
"scientific' philosophy. Ironically for the dialectical materialism institutionalized in the 
Soviet Union, the tools of production made by science determined the course of history. 
The Soviets were still building steel mills when the West was already shifting to factories 
pouring out plastics. The Soviet Defense ministry still did not have a computer in each of 
its offices when in America computers began to appear in high schools. 
Whatever the stakes for democracy in the Desert War, it was certainly about the 
Middle East oil whose control largely determines the global struggle for markets. Oil is a 
basic source for the enormous variety of items with fantastic properties which a new 
branch of science, materials science, delivers at a breathtaking pace, almost to orde r. 
Herein lies the source of the power which science displays in the field of economics. The 
freedom and vigor of that economics, which is a free-market economics, depend not only 
on the value of freedom as an ideological commodity, but also on the profuse availability 
of items to be marketed. 
Among those items are products indispensable for the improvement of daily life, such 
as a variety of foodstuffs undreamed-of a century ago. The same is true about the mainte-
nance of health through the expansion of medical skill and care, which represents the 
largest market of them all. This indispensability of science for economics has increased at 
an accelerated rate during the last three or four decades. Herein lies a still not fully appre-
ciated facet of neocapitalism, best known for the rapid rise of its main indexes, among 
them the Dow-Jones industrial average. The latter stood at 155 in January 1927. Almost 
20 years later it was still at that level. But during the next 25 years it increased fourfold, 
from 165 in June 1945 to 650 in June 1970. During the next 20 years, it increased six-
fold, standing as it did at 4000 in October 1994. 
Since then it increased, on the average, by more than a thousand each year. T ellingly, 
as even the layman had to learn, the so called tech-stocks fueled this unique growth in 
the history of the stock market. 
Parallel to this rise, and preceding it by about 20 to 30 years, there has been a similarly 
accelerated rate of growth in the number of scientists, especially in what has become 
known as the developed part of the world. I The temporal priority has been a causal prior-
ity as well, as can easily be seen by a cursory look at the reliance on science by major 
industrial firms. Investment is increasingly governed by new opportunities offered by sci-
entific inventions. 
Herein lies a reason for the huge difference between classical capitalism and neocapi-
talism. The former stretched through times during which the progress of science and 
industry may seem stagnant in comparison with their rate of growth during the last 70, 
and certainly the last fifty years. The dynamics of neocapitalism is due largely to its ever 
closer alliance with that power which science has become in modern life. The rapid 
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growth of shareholders is not so much a cause as a symptom of the vigor of neocapital-
ism and its free market economies. That vigor is manifest in the accelerated rate at which 
science delivers to the market ever new and ever more exciting products. For whatever is 
new will be bought- an almost foolproof rule that guides the art of advertising. Yet, it is 
not the advertising skills but the skills of science that provide those novelties and do it at a 
rate inconceivable 50, let alone 100 years ago. 
It should therefore be worthwhile to search for the true source of this awesome power 
tied to science. One certainly touches the deepest source of that power by echoing the 
words of a Nobel-laureate physicist, P. W. Bridgman, who defined the method of science 
as "doing one's damnedest with one's intellect." Undoubtedly the intellect, the human 
mind, is the deepest reality of which one has a direct evidence. Yet it would be strange to 
claim that only scientists are doing justice to the seemingly inexhaustible capabilities of the 
human mind. The one who first drew figures of animals with a piece of charcoal, and did 
it wearing animal skins, relied on the mind's symbol-making ability that sets man apart 
from the brutes. Was it not the greatest feat in intellectual history when the various 
sounds of human speech were generalized as a set of visual figures? 
One should, however, be reluctant to characterize as science either of these two extra-
ordinary achievements of symbolization and generalization. This reluctance is instinctive 
as well as correct. Although no one would dispute that science is symbol-making and gen-
eralization, science is clearly such in a very special sense that makes it different from all 
other ways of making symbols and generalizing. It should seem obvious that cogitation is 
science only insofar as it involves quantities. The impression that one has thereby 
expressed something very profound can be disputed all the more easily because quanti-
ties lie at the very surface of everything available to the senses in any form. 
Everything sensible has some magnitude, or size. It is through its size, or magnitude, 
that every thing is perceived in the first place. Although this was observed by Aristotle 
over two millennia ago, its validity remains unshaken regardless of its age and Aristotelian 
provenance. Again, just because Aristotle stated it, and emphatically so, one need not 
doubt the primary position of quantities among all categories of human conceptualization. 
He might have been more detailed in noting that insofar as human perception registers 
first the size of things, human perception measures them at least implicitly. For to note the 
size of something, however broadly, is to compare it to some arbitrary unit of length, or 
area, or volume, a unit equivalent to a quantity. 
Long after Aristotle, as science began to emerge as we know it today, it proved itself to 
be in a sense nothing else but a registering and correlating of quantitative properties dis-
played by the objects available, directly or indirectly, to our sensory perception. And since 
quantities are everywhere, science is universal. This universality should seem to be a 
source of the unparalleled applicability of science and therefore of its power. Further, 
since quantities are the same across all space and time, from them there accrues to sci-
ence a uniformity which is not matched by any other field of human inquiry. 
The power which this uniformity gives to science displays itself in its predictive power, 
again a unique property of science. Predictions made by historians remain mere guesses, 
however educated. This is why nobody would call history an exact science, except perhaps 
those historians who think, for instance, that we know nothing really about the causes of the 
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American Civil War until we have fed into a computer all the votes cast by members of the 
Congress during the previous 30 or so years. One need not subject to computer analysis the 
sundry opinions of physicists to be convinced that the predictions of physics are exact. But 
they are exact only because they deal exclusively with quantities, which in tum have an 
exactness unique to them. This is what assures to science a unique control over things. 
This control did not, of course, take on from the start the measure to which we are 
now accustomed. The moon, the sun, and the planets were not controlled just because 
Ptolemaic astronomy allowed an exact prediction of their position. In that respect, the first 
form of Copernican astronomy was not an improvement on Ptolemy's geocentric order-
ing of the planets. But a control it was in the sense that it liberated man from considering 
the celestial bodies to be under the control of mysterious forces and man himself to be 
under such control. Science, or the quantitative analysis of the motion of bodies across 
space and time, has not ceased revealing its power to liberate man from thinking that 
mere matter had a mysterious hold on him and that it could be manipulated only by 
magic, be it called astrology and alchemy. 
In gaining control over things in motion, the first major step consisted in Galileo's devel-
opment of the medieval idea of uniformly difform (accelerated) motion as evidenced by 
the free fall of bodies on the surface of the earth. From there it was one step, though a step 
worthy of Newton's genius, to his formulation of the third law of motion, a part of his 
broader theory of motion in a central field of force. This made possible a wide variety of 
predictions about arcane celestial motions, such as the liberation of the moon, as well as 
the retum of the comets. Halley himself celebrated this latter feat of Newtonian physics as 
one that liberated man from seeing in comets irrational hidden forces operating in nature. 
With Newton all became light, or so at least his younger contemporaries thought, who 
rightly felt very much enlightened through the power of Newton's physics. They were, at 
the same time, as was Newton himself, very much blinded by the new light. A supreme 
irony lay in the fact that Newton's third law, according to which force is proportional to 
the product of mass and acceleration, left him and all scientists in a conceptual quandary. 
At that time Bishop Berkeley appeared to be a useless gadfly when he pointed out to the 
Newtonians their inability to go straight from the mathematical formula for what they 
called force to the idea and reality of the force itself. 
For a while little attention was paid to this by most scientists and philosophers. The rush 
for control advanced apace and left little room for other considerations. Lavoisier saw his 
achievements in chemistry as something equal to those of Newton's. The isolation of oxy-
gen as a true element certainly ushered in previously unsuspected powers of science. 
Organic chemistry soon opened its first chapter with the artificial production of urea. Today, 
parts of biology (it should be enough to think of the double helix structure of DNA mole-
cules and the genome project) match the exactness of physics as well as its awesome pow-
ers. That power of science, let it not be forgotten, is tied to its ability to register, measure, cor-
relate, and verify quantities. Quantitative specifications alone secure that procedure. 
Physics itself, this paragon of exactness in science, kept extending its range. The 19th 
century witnessed the rise of physical optics, of thermodynamics, and last but not least of 
electromagnetism and electrodynamics. Atomic physics, nuclear physics, particle physics, 
plasma physics are but the principal names of new areas (and new powers) of the exact 
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sciences. They are exact because they can specify quantitatively the criteria of the truth of 
their conclusions. For it is always those quantitative specifications that are the object of the 
experimental verification of scientific theories. Or as Einstein once remarked: If only one 
of the consequences of the theory of general relativity is disproved by experiment, the 
entire theory ought to be discarded. 
Some time before this, towards the end of the 19th century, some physicists, who 
wanted to see to the bottom of things, began to be deeply puzzled by the success of their 
theories. Some of them concluded that there were only quantitative relations but no enti-
ties such as force. They are still to make sense of the fact that the relations useful in sci-
ence are purely quantitative relations, yet those relations obviously do not make up the 
whole of physical reality. Were they to appreciate this fully, it would dawn on them that 
the marvelous power of science is also its dire poverty. This is still to be suspected by 
most non-scientists overawed by the power of science. 
Actually, scientists themselves, and here I mean especially physicists, who cultivate the 
most exact branch of science, physics, still find the very idea of scientific theory slipping 
through their scientific fingers. Their inability to articulate this received its classic expres-
sion a hundred years ago from Heinrich Hertz, who verified experimentally the existence 
of electromagnetic waves as predicted by Maxwell's theory. After having given much 
thought to what it was he had discovered, Hertz seems to have thrown up his arms as he 
wrote: "Maxwell's theory is Maxwell's system of equations. 
No phrase tells more, in such a concise way, of the power and poverty of science, and 
of the fact that the two go together. For Maxwell's theory, no less than Newton's theory or 
Einstein's theory, can be compared to a huge architectural structure which is totally useless 
in a most important sense: From the structure itself one cannot infer what it is related to in 
the great world of material reality. One need not be a theoretical physicist to perceive this. 
It is enough to recall that the same inverse square allows one to predict the variations of 
attraction between any two pieces of matter, as well as between any two bodies on which 
free electrical charges have been produced by rubbing them. The quantitative relations of 
attraction in both cases are exactly the same. But knowing only those quantitative relations, 
one would not know whether one deals with electrical or with gravitational attraction, 
much less would one know what gravitation is and what electricity is. 
Other cases of this intrinsic irrelevance of the equations of physics to the nature of 
material reality could be listed to no end. The Fourier equations are useful to handle the 
quantitative parameters of a great variety of effects propagated in a physical medium, be it 
gas, fluid or solid. The so-called Mathieu equation can handle equally well the balancing 
act of an acrobat standing on the top of a sphere and the vibrations of a distended surface 
such as a drum. But in spite of their equality in some quantitative aspects, who would 
doubt that the two realities are not the same at all? 
In sum, it is not quantitative relations that give physical meaning to physical science, but 
some clearly non-quantitative perceptions, judgments, and conclusions. All these are heavily 
present as the edifice of a scientific theory begins to be erected. One may consider all those 
judgments, conclusions, assumptions, and premises as the scaffolding without which no edi-
fice can be raised. The wider is the bearing a physical theory wants to achieve, the more 
such scaffolding it needs. But once the physical theory in its mathematical form is in place, 
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the scaffolding can go. And so it does. Maxwell started formulating his theory with specula-
tions about rods, pulleys, and rubber bands to visualize for himself the transmission of elec-
tromagnetic forces through the dielectric. But once he had formulated his famous equations, 
there was no longer any need for those mechanical props, although they seemed to tie 
those equations to reality. Maxwell's theory revealed itself to be nothing more (and nothing 
less) than Maxwell's system of equations, in itself a pure mathematical formalism. 
The fact is that once the mathematical formalism is in place, the scaffolding is not so 
much removed as detached by itself from the edifice as something utterly irrelevant for 
the purpose it was meant to serve. This still leaves unanswered the question about the 
true nature of the edifice, left in its splendid isolation, so to speak. Is it a physical edifice? 
Not at all. In fact, hardly an edifice in the ordinary sense of that word. Equations are a set 
of numbers, or rather numbers or quantities that are to replace any letter of the alphabet 
that occurs in those equations. Only then do those equations perform the function proper 
to them, that is, yield quantitatively exact results that are also predictive about similarly 
quantitative features of a physical reality. But of that physical reality those equations con-
tain nothing at all. They do not even touch upon it directly. 
A similar story can be told about Bohr's formula to calculate and predict radiations emit-
ted by the hydrogen atom. The formula, which seemed to have a magic power in dealing 
with physical reality, revealed more and more of that magic as it became generalized, first 
through Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and then through Schrodinger's wave mechanics. 
The physicist felt less and less the need to be concerned about the scaffolding (a largely 
philosophical commodity) than about the edifice itself. But the paradox of riches versus 
poverty could not be evaded. In fact, it looms large except for physicists who instinctively 
adopt positions once held by Pythagoreans and Platonists without suspecting their untenabil-
ity. The physicist, for whom philosophy is usually bunk, may not even care to cover up his 
philosophical nakedness by invoking the name of this or that major philosopher. He merely 
compounds nakedness with fallacies, such as when he suggests, on the basis of purely math-
ematical statistics, that events ontologically happen though without a cause. The marvelous 
mathematical edifice of quantum mechanics is full of the ghosts of this fallacy. 
The physicist will not do much better by invoking the name of Plato and of his theory 
of ideas. Just to invoke Plato is not equivalent to proving that geometrical figures and 
other quantitative relations exist outside the mind, and much less that they give rise to 
material reality. Only a proof of this would tum the poverty of exact science into a philo-
sophical cornucopia out of which reality pours forth . In the absence of such a proof, 
which is a task for philosophy and not for mathematics, the poverty of science remains 
total: Its exact formulas and measurements remain in themselves mere numbers, devoid 
of any physical reality. To his philosophical discredit the physicist may attribute a 
metaphysical existence to numbers and formulas, but that existence remains locked up in 
a conceptual stratosphere separate from physical reality, the reality which alone ought to 
be of final interest for science. 
There is no point in reifying, in a Platonist mood, reference systems, such as the ones 
that are accelerated with respect to one another. One must have on hand real bodies in 
order to make the mathematical formalism of Einstein's general theory of relativity mean-
ingful for physics. There is no point in discarding the very physical ether of Newtonian 
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physics and then replacing it furtively with a field, first a mere formalism and then full of 
physical energy, disguised as zero-point oscillations in the vacuum. The clever use of new 
words does not resolve age-old, nagging problems. The problem is that physical content 
cannot be obtained from mathematical equations alone, however successful. Poverty can 
never supply the commodities it lacks. 
That poverty, or the mathematical formalism of exact science, cannot even secure its 
own ultimate certainty, whatever its astonishing power in dealing with the physical world. 
The day may, of course, come when physical theory will find, for the moment, nothing in 
the physical world that presents a problem to it. Such an expectation is certainly obligato-
ry for anyone who holds that Cod ·'arranged everything according to measure, number, 
and weight" (Sirach I I :20) and that he made man in His image, endowing him thereby 
with a mental ability to see precisely that arrangement. Apart from this one can entertain 
such an expectation with an eye on the acceleratedly growing range of the applicability of 
mathematical physics. It would, naturally, be foolish to think that just because unex-
plained phenomena have for the moment stopped flowing into the ken of the physicist in 
possession of a presumably ultimate theory, they will never do it again. Yet the physicist 
can never be certain that his ultimate theory is truly such. As long as Codet's incomplete-
ness theory is valid, such certainty is denied to the physicist. 
For those who cannot follow the steps that led Codel to his epoch-making conclusion, 
there is a far simpler pointer to the radical poverty of exact science. Everyone may sense 
something dramatic in the plain phrase, science cannot handle even the multiplication 
table singlehanded, since no less a physicist than Eddington uttered it. The truth of that 
phrase should be obvious to anyone who reflects on an elementary fact: basic mathemati-
cal operators signified by + - x and + must be explained in words in order to know what 
to do with them. Even numbers themselves must be explained in words. Not only have 
the numbers from I to 9 been written down in a great variety of ways, but even greater is 
the variety of the words in countless different languages that can stand for them. Nor can 
0, a sign clearly of something, stand for nothing, unless one decides with words that it 
should stand for literally nothing. 
All this should be plainly evident, but perhaps more convincing if confirmed from the 
mouth of a prominent mathematician, Hermann Weyl. He warned that in mathematics 
one must have directives given in words in order to understand "how to handle the 
symbols and formulae."2 Indeed, without any reference to religion, it should be clear that 
in the beginning was the word, even if only that kind of word which is man's articulation 
of the fact that knowledge begins with registering external reality. Science is subject to 
this rule as long as it does not want to be divorced from experiments performed with 
real instruments about a real world. This may seem a mere quibble except to those 
stunned by some prominent quantum cosmologists' claim that they can produce entire 
universes by concentrating their consciousness on the wave functions corresponding to 
those universes. They brazenly think that thereby those functions would ·'collapse' into 
reality. One wonders why those physicists do not experiment with creating silver dollars, 
let alone heaps of them, by letting some wave functions collapse as they think hard 
about them. By thinking hard on the problem of gravitation, Newton had no such inane 
cogitation in mind. 
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The words, let it be repeated, without which mathematics cannot make its very first steps, 
are not numbers. They, and the immense majority of words, constitute a class of their own. 
To illustrate this difference, let the meaning of an integer, say I, be represented by a square. 
The appropriateness of such a representation should seem obvious, because just as a square, 
the number I, as do other integers, denotes something well defined, that is, precisely circum-
scribed. Such a number can be neither more nor less than what it is. The adding of integers, 
which results in a strictly defined quantity, would then be readily illustrated by the precise 
contours of the juxtaposition of squares. This preciseness prevails throughout the realm of 
numbers and of geometrical figures even though, such as in the case of irrational and imagi-
nary numbers, the exactness cannot be calculated in a definitive way. 
Suppose one tries to represent in a similar way the meaning of other words, say, the 
word politics. The dictionary defines it as "the art or science of government." Clearly, the 
meaning included in this definition cannot be strictly circumscribed, that is, defined. If one 
tries to represent the extent of the meaning by an area, it cannot have a clear line for its 
boundary. Politics has a meaning which can include more or less, as almost all words do, 
except numbers. This indefiniteness becomes even more pronounced when one tries to 
compose the meaning of the word politics from the partial superimposition of the three 
words used for its definition. The word art has a meaning which is anything but definite. 
The same is true even of science and of government. The meaning of each of these three 
words would be represented by an area with no strict contours. Their partial superimposi-
tion can only increase the measure of that indefiniteness. Clearly, the extent of the mean-
ing of most words resembles not a block but a patch of fog. Worse, the shape of those 
patches, without strict contours, is forever changing as if they were so many amoebas. In 
fact they have less definiteness than amoebas do. For unlike amoebas that are enclosed 
within a membrane, patches of fog appear to have edges only from a distance. One hardly 
ever knows the moment when one begins to be enveloped by a cloud. 
In fact even words that denote strictly circumscribed entities will not reveal a definite-
ness when a close look is taken at the definition. A good illustration of this is the word 
block. Leaving aside the problem posed by the fact that any better dictionary would list 
over a dozen different meanings to that word, enough problems remain in its most obvi-
ous meaning, "'a solid piece, as of wood, with one or more flat sides .. ' The words one or 
more by themselves exclude definiteness. But even the word solid does not lend itself to a 
unique meaning. There is no way of deciding where solidity begins and ends. 
It is this indefiniteness, so different from the definiteness of numbers, that sets the exact sci-
ences apart from aU other areas of discourse, called humanities, including religion and theolo-
gy. The difference is the one between what can and what cannot be measured, or the differ-
ence between the metric and the non-metric, the quantitative and the non-quantitative. The 
difference assures to science both its precision and exactness but also reveals its dire poverty. 
Science is about quantities because it has to measure, and unless science measures, it runs the 
risk of becoming a science-coated pseudo-humanistic discipline. This, it should be noted, is all 
too often the case with far-flung dicta of evolutionary biologists. In measuring science obtains 
its precision, but also reveals its penury with respect to anything else except quantities. The 
humanities may appear woefully inexact in their conclusions as compared with the numerical 
exactness of science, but the inexactness, if handled wisely, assures them of untold riches. 
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That properly wise handling begins with the assertion of reality, external, physical reality. 
It is a philosophical step, whether one likes philosophy or not. Although it is a logical step, it 
is not a step of logic. While the relation between the object and the subject <the known and 
the knower} cannot be constrained within the cubbyholes of logic, it remains a supremely 
rational facet. The registering of reality is not a scientific step either, even though through its 
quantitative aspects one registers physical reality. This is a philosophical starting point 
towards the quantitative account of the quantitative aspects of things in motion, which is 
physics, the most exact of all sciences. To register reality is also the first step towards any 
other forms or levels of reality, unless one fancies reasoning to be a continual hanging in 
mid-air, or one resigns oneself to be a solipsist, muttering to oneself idealist flights of fancy. 
There is nothing inexact in the act of registering reality through its immediately per-
ceived quantitative aspect. What is registered is the reality of a thing with extension, its 
very existence, without measuring it with any precision. Such a grasp of reality can justly 
be called exaa because this word also denotes strict and incomplete accordance with a 
fact. For unless this direct tie of man with reality is not doubted or undermined, there 
remains no real content whatever to the edifice or structure of exact science. This appar-
ent inexactness of philosophy or of the humanities in general is the key to the enormous 
richness of reality, of which nothing is higher and more important than religion. 
This is a point of the utmost importance for a sane and fruitful understanding of the 
relation between religion and science. Nothing is more dispiriting indeed than to see the-
ologians begging from science for morsels of certainty and for tidbits of approval. It is the 
sight of the impoverished rich begging for sustenance from the have-nots. In a sense one 
can understand those rich, though they also deserve a goodly dose of pity. For that beg-
ging is a symptom of the fact that nowadays only such items seem to be approved and 
successfully marketed that are wrapped in copious references either to sex, or to sport, or 
to science, the three s's of an increasingly wayward culture. 
In such a culture there may be some justification for listing scientists who are also 
believers in God. Scoffers at religion who shore up their shallowness with copious refer-
ences to science may be momentarily stopped in their tracks with a reference to such a 
list.) There is a perennial effectiveness in the argument called solvitur ambulando. But to 
give too much importance to such a list may mislead those whom it is meant to serve. 
They should not derive more from that list than a momentary respite in a patently hostile 
cultural ambiance, which everywhere in the developed world, that is, in a world devel-
oped by science, is rapidly shedding the last remnants of its religious heritage. 
That world is not, of course, averse to claiming some religiosity. But what it wants in 
the form of religion is some higher form of aestheticism. Within such religion there is no 
personal God to worship, no God who can and does give a revelation, and proves that 
revelation by miracles, precisely because it sets a choice between heaven and hell and 
does so with no apologies to man, ancient or modem, scientific or not. No wonder that 
spokesmen of an aesthetically desensitized "revelation" feel utterly uncertain about them-
selves and seek solace and support from what they believe to be science, but what is actu-
ally a philosophical misrepresentation of it. In that misrepresentation of it, science has only 
power but no poverty. It is made to look like an edifice bursting with all the choice 
commodities, although it is a bare shell of purely quantitative correlations. One would 
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look there in vain for anything that gives to man a sense of purpose, let alone a purpose 
that abides beyond death, for anything that can qualify as moral value. 
This may sound sacrilegious to the high priests, some of them in clergymen's clothing, 
of that science-coated religion which may best be called higher aestheticism.' If this 
vignette reminds one of higher criticism, which has always been a rationalist mysticism, so 
much the better for the sake of clarity. Higher aestheticism is indeed the logical offspring 
of higher criticism. Let its high priests remind themselves of Einstein's admission, made in 
old age, that he had not all his life derived a drop of ethical value from science. Let them 
remind themselves of the guideline, "never use the words higher or lower, which 
Darwin, the evolutionist, set to himself, although he honored it in the breachs Let them 
also awaken themselves to the fallacy of the pabulum which Einstein dangled before 
some men of religion: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind. 
The fallacy will not be noticed until one has his eyes opened to the principle that reli-
gion is not about how the heavens go, but how to go to heaven. The difference between 
these two hows is the difference between quantities and everything else, the difference 
between the power and the poverty of science, or conversely, the difference between a 
religion that has something to offer which science utterly lacks in its radical poverty, and a 
religion that, once it has divested itself of its riches, begs science for placebos of wealth. 
Once that difference has been noticed, duly pondered, and thoroughly assimilated into 
one's mental awareness, the proper relation between science and religion may be per-
ceived, provided, of course, that one has the courage to spell out the basic dictates and 
principal ramifications of one's religion. In fact something even less may do, speaking in 
abstracto. This less' simply demands that one should have the utter readiness to submit to 
the arbitration of science anything in one's religious assertions that implies something 
quantitative about external physical reality. This is the price a man of religion has to pay 
to science, while denying to science competence about anything which is not quantitative. 
The price should be rigorously paid, with not a penny withheld from the bargain, if the 
man of religion is to hope reasonably for peaceful coexistence between science and reli-
gion. Of course, the other side, the scientific side, also should be willing to strike that deal 
which is far from being certain. The fantastic success of science with quantities has misled 
quite a few scientists, indeed, the majority of the scientific establishment, into believing 
that science is the only kind of knowledge worth having. In that misguided belief of theirs 
they all too often let a great many non-scientific, plainly philosophical and ethical princi-
ples ride piggyback on science, without being ready to acknowledge it. 
With this reservation in mind the man of religion may hope for a peaceful coexistence 
with science provided he does not let science overstep the limits of its competence. He 
must not hope for a harmony, which implies some integration, let alone for some higher 
fusion . Religion and science are about two different hows that are conceptually irreducible 
to one another. Man may chafe about this irreducibility, but one cannot change it. 
Undoubtedly in God's mind there is a conceptual continuum from quantities to values 
and back, but this is his secret. For man the only sane option is to learn to live with that 
irreducibility and accept humbly that what has been separated by God for him, he should 
not try to join together, in the sense of fusing them together. An excellent precept for phi-
losophizing is the motto, "distinguish in order to unite," provided the unification does not 
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aim at abolishing unchangeable differences. Man, in order to keep his sanity, must be on 
guard against false gods who a la Hegel claim to have overcome that conceptual 
irreducibility between the realm of quantities and the other, far greater realm of human 
experience, which for shorthand may be designated as the realm of qualities or values. 
A shorthand, indeed, to be used cautiously. Otherwise it may lead to shortchanging 
that much wider experience through surreptitiously excluding from it the full range of 
plain existence statements and let that range slip imperceptibly into the domain of sci-
ence. Yet one cannot insist strongly enough that, strictly speaking, the scientific method 
does not entitle the scientist to assert the reality of the instrument which is in his very 
hands. The scientist must assume that reality, with or without philosophical articulation, so 
that he might start investigating some quantitative properties of it. This may seem an 
unduly strict restriction on the scientific method, but unless one insists on it, one gives sci-
ence carte blanche to do things that only Cod can do. 
Thus if science is thought of as restricted to quantities, all that senseless talk about sci-
ence demonstrating the creation of the universe will be nipped in the bud as so much 
plain rubbish. Creation, properly so called, is creation out of nothing, and not creative 
writing or something even less. But is nothing, or the total absence of reality, something 
with quantitative or measurable properties? Once this is pondered, the inanity of any talk 
about the moment of creation as having taken place I 6 billion years ago becomes imme-
diately apparent. Science can, of course, safely make measurements I 6 billion years back 
into cosmic history. (Creationists should take note . . J But this is something very different 
from saying that creation took place at that time. 
In these days, when books on scientific cosmology cover half of all coffee tables, it may 
come as a shock to learn what may be the most gigantic evidence of the radical poverty 
of science: The scientific method is incapable of demonstrating that there is a cosmos, or 
universe, taken in a strict sense, that is, standing for the strict totality of consistently inter-
acting things. No man, not even scientists or their scientific instruments, can get outside 
the universe in order to observe and measure it. Without such a feat, any discourse of sci-
entists about cosmology, provided it is about the universe and not merely about a super-
congeries of galaxies, remains, no matter how intricate mathematically, a philosophical dis-
course, although in their case almost invariably deprived of even an elementary measure 
of philosophical sophistication. 
Nowhere is Einstein's dictum, "the man of science is a poor philosopher,"6 more valid 
than in reference to scientific cosmology. One can only wish that he himself had taken to 
heart that dictum of his, whose truth is amply brought out by the history of science during 
the last four hundred years. In that case Einstein's good, commonsense warnings might, in 
view of his enormous prestige as a scientist, have awakened many who should know bet-
ter. They would not now boldly speak from prestigious chairs about the ability of science 
to create entire universes literally out of nothing. Their "boldspeak" regularly appears in 
headlines in the science sections of prestigious dailies? The comment which all this truly 
deserves has been anticipated by the Psalmist: "They have set their mouths in the heavens 
and their tongues dictate to the earth" (Ps 73:9). Their countless hapless victims were por-
trayed in advance in the same Psalm: "So the people turn to follow them and drink in all 
their words." Worse, some of them think that they gain thereby in religious depths. 
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Once this warning about the cosmic range of the impotency of science is swallowed as 
a much needed pill, it will be easier to see through the fallacy of certain evolutionists who 
delight in disproving the existence of design and purpose in the universe. It is not their sci-
entific business to say a single word on that score. They should still digest the devastating 
remark which A. N. Whitehead made before a prestigious audience in Princeton in 1929: 
'Those who devote themselves to the purpose of proving that there is no purpose, consti-
tute an interesting subject for study."8 Theologians who spend their lives in squeezing 
from science proofs for cosmic design and purpose cut no less sorry figures. 
Any statement about purpose is a radically philosophical proposition. If, however, a 
theologian eschews philosophy for fear that proper respect for reason would undermine 
his understanding of faith, he should stop talking even about faith and theology. For ulti-
mately, the truth and cogency of all discourse, the scientific as well as the far more exten-
sive non-scientific kind, must rest on philosophy, or rather on one's theory of knowledge. 
Those who do not wish to face up to this requirement will engage in fog-mongering with 
plenty of specious smokescreening thrown in for good measure. 
The scientific class of these dubious entrepreneurs have, of course, one saving grace, 
which their non-scientific or humanistic counterparts cannot have. The grace that saves 
something of even the most unphilosophical discourse of scientists is the set of quantita-
tive relations invited by their topic insofar as it is scientific. Quantities carry with them a 
built-in clarity which other words, so many patches of fog, do not possess, however indis-
pensable they are for explaining even the clarity of numbers.9 
The issue of a proper understanding of the relation of science and religion therefore boils 
down to a proper understanding of what we do when we use words in reference to reality. 
Such an understanding is worlds removed from the often self-defeating objectives of linguis-
tic philosophers, especially of their Oxford branch of logical positivists who have claimed so 
many hapless theologians as their victims. Articulated understanding or philosophy is not a 
talk about talk, for in that case solipsists would be the only consistent philosophers. 
Hardly less miserable are those theologians who sought, and are still seeking, liberating 
vistas in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is not science but 
a philosophy and a very bad one at that. One can but pity those theologians who look for 
such vistas in Bohr s principle of complementarity or in Heisenberg's principle of uncer-
tainty. Complementarity cannot be a truly basic and therefore really first principle unless 
one pairs it with non-complementarity and sets up this pairing as an absolute starting 
point in reasoning. This can, however, be done only by sinking human cogitation into the 
abysses of illogicality where no statement can carry an unambiguous meaning. Abysses do 
not cease to be such by paying no attention to them. 
A good illustration of this inattention is Bohr's brave protestation of intellectual humili-
ty (made at the start of each of his lecture courses) that" every statement I utter should be 
taken by you not for a statement but a question." lo Bohr did not seem to suspect that this 
statement of his could not also be a question. He was consistent on practical or political 
side. In terms of the universal range he attributed to the principle of complementarity, 
Bohr took the Soviet system as something complementary to, that is, something on equal 
footing with, Western democracy and freedom. Tellingly, though inconsistently, he sought 
safety and freedom in the Western and not the Eastern direction. The theologian cuts a 
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similarly odd figure from the viewpoint of logic (to say nothing of other viewpoints), 
when he claims that adultery should not be considered a sin because virtue and sin are 
complementary and therefore on the same footing. Again, can a Christian theologian, 
who should believe in the Cod called He Who Is, take non-existence as something 
complementary to, that is, on equal footing with that Cod? But is not precisely this what 
process theologians, so confident of their being steeped in the science of evolution, imply 
in the ultimate analysis? They still have to come clean on the point of whether a "Cod" 
who evolves can be worshipped? Or should the theologian be allowed to play hollow 
games with that basic word in his subject matter? 
Similarly unsparing reflections are in order about the theological exploitation of 
Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. That principle, insofar as it is science and not 
something else, means nothing more and nothing less than that conjugate variables can-
not be measured with full precision as long as one applies the statistical formalism of 
quantum mechanics. Heisenberg failed to see this limitation of his finding when he pro-
posed it in 1927 and concluded in the same breath that thereby the principle of causality 
was overthrown once and for all. There followed an orgy in uncausal reasoning, clothed 
in science, aimed at the defense of the freedom of the will. 
Yet within two years it was pointed out that Heisenberg's claim was an elementary fal-
lacy in reasoning which prevented him from perceiving a basic limitation (and poverty) of 
exact science. The one who did this in the pages of Nature was a prominent philosopher 
of the University of Liverpool, although it could have been done by any sharp-witted 
undergraduate. It is plain elementary logic to note that there is a non-sequitur in the basic 
dogma in Heisenberg's reasoning which is a pillar of the Copenhagen philosophy: an 
interaction that cannot be measured exactly, cannot take place exactly. I , For the first part 
of the proposition is operational, whereas the second part is ontological. But to rush from 
the operational into the ontological is to commit that elementary failure in logic for which 
the Creeks of old had already coined a phrase, metabasis eis alia genos, or jumping from 
one category into another. One aspect of that failure in logic is to fail to recognize that 
there is no direct conceptual access from quantities into qualities and everything else. 
Finally, Einstein's theory of relativity. Many are the theologians dabbling in science who 
took that theory, of which they could not read even two pages, for the pretext to relativize 
their theology in order to make it suitable to an utterly relativistic culture. Of course, scien-
tists, including Einstein himself, were not eager to enlighten those theologians on a point 
which remained largely hidden even to him. The point is that Einstein's theory of relativity 
is the most absolutist theory ever proposed in the history of physics. I' It is a theory much 
more profoundly absolutist than Newton's physics with its absolutely stable medium, the 
ether. Yet Einstein failed to stress the absolutist character of this theory even though as 
early as 1 922 he recognized that it would have been more proper to call it the theory of 
invariance. Thus the merry-go-round of the relativization of everything in the name of sci-
ence started whirling, and no attempt was made at stopping it by precisely those to whom 
our culture listens most, scientists of course, in addition to sportsmen and sexologists. 
For those who find all this heavy going, there is a royal road to see something of the 
very basics that govern the relation of science and religion. That road is the course of sci-
ence through its history. The first thing to note is the relative youth of science in compari-
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son with arts, literature, and philosophy. That youth, a mere half a millennium at most, 
emerges against a dark background, about which it is very dangerous to speak nowadays 
when all cultures must be viewed as equally productive and equally noble. Yet with 
respect to science all the great ancient cultures were most unproductive. In fact, in all of 
them science suffered what may best be called a stillbirth. For just as a stillbirth is preced-
ed by a long maturing in the womb, full of great promise, in the same way there were in 
all ancient cultures technical inventions and theoretical insights that suggested a bri lliant 
future. That future never materialized in any of them. 
This pattern of repeated failures is the most monumental and most ignored facet of 
the entire history of science. There are various reasons for this. In the ongoing dechristian-
ization of Western culture, it has become unfashionable to recall the fact that science is 
unmistakably a child of the West, and in fact of a still Christian West. A logical reluctance 
if one considers that the dechristianization of the West received its major impulse from 
that Enlightenment for whose spokesmen science would function as the true savior of 
mankind, but only if another Savior, Jesus Christ, had first been duly removed from the 
center stage. It is incompatible with such an outlook on Western intellectual history to 
give serious consideration to the incontestable fact that science experienced its first viable 
birth through John Buridan's formulation, in 1348, of the theory of impetus. 
When translated into the theory of inertial motion, the impetus theory would immedi-
ately reveal its immense potentiality for science, which is the quantitative study of the 
quantitative aspect of things in motion. Moreover, if one views that theory against the fail-
ure of great minds, such as Aristotle and A vicenna, to seize on it, one can grasp even 
more forcefully the measure of Buridan's achievements. But then one has to face up to 
the fact that Buridan was led by a Christian dogma, the dogma of creation out of nothing 
and in time, to his epoch-making insight. For those who see in science, especially in 
physics, a cornucopia for everything it must be unbearable to recognize that the greatest 
poverty of science was remedied by theology and by a truly dogmatic type of it at that. 
Most irnportantly, the remedy came in a potentially quantitative form, which could lend 
itself to genuinely scientific application. 
Looking in such a way at the origin of modern science saves one from trying to locate 
it in some sociological factor or in some industrial need, and even in some generic, 
though theologically coated movement, such as the rise of Puritanism in England n Those 
fond of this latter factor are also often led by a visceral dislike of the Middle Ages, which 
they try to paint as black as possible. This perception still haunts rnany Protestant theolo-
gians who speak about the convergence of science and religion. The same perception 
makes uneasy most Catholic theologians busy with the same subject. In this age of ecu-
menics taken in a wider than theological sense, they feel they would lose the sympathy of 
their Protestant and secularist counterparts were they to be outspoken concerning the 
medieval, Christian origin of physics, which is science at its best, that is, at its most exact. ,q 
Historically it should be absolutely clear that Christianity provided the spark whereby 
science became a self-sustaining enterprise. After Buridan the advance toward that self-
sustaining form of science was almost inevitable, and after Copernicus, who relied heavily 
on Buridan, irresistible. With Newton, there was on hand a science of physics that began 
to progress in terms of its own purely mathematical strength. Since the formulation of 
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Newton's theory of motion in a central field of force, there is no need for physics to rely 
on anything else, including theology. The conceptual analysis of the work of Faraday and 
Maxwell, two equally devout Christians, shows that their crucial contribution to electro-
magnetism was independent of their religious beliefs, even though they may have 
thought the opposite. Even more is this true of Planck and Einstein. The only theologically 
relevant facet in their creativity is that it implied a middle-road epistemology, the only 
basis on which a theologian can speak reasonably about the rational proofs of the exis-
tence of God and even about the rationality of revelation. 
Surprising as this may seem, truly creative scientists never cared about articulating in 
detail a methodology of science. Scientists, to say nothing of philosophers of science, who 
did that, almost invariably went wrong. It is not possible to do science, let alone creative 
science, on the premises laid down by Bacon, Descartes, Hume, Locke, Comte, and Ernst 
Mach, to mention only a few well known figures. In our century one may add to this 
hardly flattering list such names as Bachelard, Koyre, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, or all those 
who confused the psychology and sociology of being at grips with this or that scientific 
problem with the problem itself. 
Does this mean that nothing positive can be said about the relation of science and reli-
gion in the midst of such confusion? The first thing to note is that in order to say some-
thing positive about that relation, one has to say something positively clear about what sci-
ence and what religion one has in mind. Shadow boxing, artful camouflaging, escaping 
into vague generalities (so that everyone may be pleased and publishers may make hand-
some profits) are procedures unworthy of self-respecting intellects. 
Owing to the fact that such intellects are not the ones which the public loves to hear 
most, it may be risky to call attention to a facet of human curiosity which is at work both 
in science and in theology, or simply in the humanities. To be sure, the curiosity appears 
with different nuances in both of those domains. This should be clear to anyone who had 
not yet discarded philosophy as useless ballast. That curiosity invariably prompts questions 
that appear in this form or are reducible to it: Why such and not something else? 
The first to phrase in terms of such a question the dynamic of human inquiry, though 
without noting its universal relevance, was Leibniz, a philosopher, a scientist, a theologian, 
a historian- all in one. Of these the historian was most at a loss, partly because history is 
so full of all sorts of suchness that, as Chesterton once noted, they can be mined to 
demonstrate any case of progression or retrogression. The scientist is far more fortunate 
because the items of suchness he notices are all quantitative ones. Compared with all 
other items of such ness, or patterns, they are the most straightforward, whatever the com-
plexity of the mathematics they invite. The theologian too looks at peculiar facts (the facts 
of salvation history, for instance) and tries to find in them an overarching pattern or prin-
ciple. The case of the philosopher, unless he has cast his lot with a phenomenology that 
tries to make do without ontology, is, of course, the most fundamental: For in asking the 
question- why such and not something else?- he looks for the ontological ground that 
explains that suchness. 
A particular example may shed much light on these differences and also on the nature 
of the convergence between science and religion as governed and mediated by philoso-
phy. Until the middle of this century, speculation about cosmogenesis was dominated by 
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Laplace's nebular hypothesis. Such a cosmogenesis tried to explain the present, exceed-
ingly peculiar, such ness of physical reality by tracing it back to a primordial nondescript 
state of affairs about which nothing in particular was known, except that it was nebu-
10us. IS The enterprise should have appeared doomed to failure because of the logical falla-
cy it rested upon. Homogeneity, if it is truly such, never gives rise to heterogeneity. Quite 
a different picture arises from modem scientific cosmology. However far it carries one 
back into the cosmic past, it always shows an exceedingly specific state of affairs that 
lends itself to strict quantitative evaluation. Quantities are specificities par excellence. 
Assuming therefore that at least one of the major cosmological models coincides with 
the true universe, one can consider the question about its total such ness as a question, the 
answer to which must be sought in a factor beyond the physical universe, or metaphysics 
in short. But even apart from taking any of our present scientific cosmological models as 
referring to the real universe, the absolute totality of things, it is possible to argue that any 
set of such ness finds its explanation only in another set. Invoking therefore the principle 
that prohibits regress to infinity, one can still argue that cosmic suchness must have a cre-
ative (in a strict sense) choice for its existence, a choice that can be credited only to Cod, 
who is personal and omnipotent, that is, not subject to some process. For any harmony 
set up between science and process-theology is a selling out of any sane discourse about a 
Cod who can truly be worshipped, and not merely dreamed about in terms of some 
higher aesthetics, such as panentheism, which so readily reveals itself as plain pantheism. 
Those with more (or less) philosophical acumen will simply say that even the existence 
of a telephone pole demonstrates the existence of Cod. For the size of such a pole or any 
piece of matter is a pointer to its ontological existence, which is clearly limited and there-
fore not self-explaining. Those who cannot or dare not probe these philosophical depths, 
visible from the surface of everything, should disqualify themselves from talking about sci-
ence and religion. It makes no sense to enrich an impoverished religion by ransacking the 
poverty of science and distracting thereby from the riches of true religion. Any discourse 
about the latter should be part of that logihe latreia (or reasoned worship) which Paul him-
self specified (of all places in his Letter to the Romans, 12: I) as the hallmark of genuine 
service of Cod. 
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